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ABSTRACT
Given the level of its production in the U.S., a firm that produces more
abroad tends to have fewer employees in the U.S. and to pay slightly higher
salaries and wages to them. The most likely explanation seems to be that the
larger a firm's foreign production, the greater its ability to allocate the
more labor-intensive and less skill-intensive portions of its activity to
locations outside the United States. This relationship is stronger among manu-
facturing firms than among service industry firms, probably because services
are less tradable than manufactured goods or components, and service
industries may therefore be less able to break up the production process to
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of foreign direct
investment (FDI) on the size and skill levels of the domestic employment of
U.S. parent companies. We are particularly concerned with the service indus-
tries, but we investigate manufacturing industries as well to determine
whether these effects differ between manufacturing and service industries.
There are a number of ways in which U.S. FDI might be expected to affect
the level and/or the skill composition of U.S. employment. Two of them in-
volve effects on trade. One channel that has been widely discussed is the
substitution of foreign affiliate production for U.S. exports. Another avenue
is the substitution of imports from affiliates for goods produced in the
U.S. Still another possibility is that even if there were no trade effects,
investment abroad substitutes for, or crowds out investment at home. This
might happen if the investible funds of a firm or of an industry were limited
and could be added to only at increasing cost.'
Even if there were no effect on the amount of production in the U.S., the
level of U.S. employment might be altered by the reallocation of various
stages or processes of production between U.S. parents and their foreign
affiliates. For example, if affiliate production were more labor intensive
However, some effects of this nature, although not very strong ones, are
suggested in Stevens and Lipsey (1988).—2—
than parent production in the U.S. a reallocation of production could reduce
the level of U.S. employment.2 Similar effects could take place with respect
to skill intensity; that is, the allocation of low skill intensity production
to foreign operations could reduce the home demand for unskilled labor and
raise the average skill and average compensation level at home.
We deal only briefly with the effects of U.S. direct investment on U.S.
exports here because they have been studied extensively elsewhere. However,
we do extend the earlier work to cover the service sector. We have not
attempted to deal with effects of direct investment on U.S. imports because
the imports from affiliates are so small relative to U.S. production. The
crowding out effect on investment is studied in another paper (Stevens and
Lipsey, 1988). What we do concentrate on in this paper is the effects of U.S.
direct investment abroad on the labor intensity of U.S. production (employment
for a given level of output) and the skill intensity of U.S. production by the
investing firms.
The Data
In investigating these relationships we considered three indicators of
the multinationals' activity abroad: affiliate total assets; affiliate
property, plant, and equipment (PPE); and net sales (net of imports from
parents).3 The data relate to individual nonbank parents and their nonbank
2For U.S. firms, see Courtney and Leipztger (1975) for both U.S. and Swedish
firms, see Lipsey, Kravis, and Roldan (1982), and for foreign firms in Brazil,
see Morley and Smith (1974).
The amount of direct foreign investment was not used as an indicator
because it has a number of disadvantages as a measure of foreign affiliate
activity. Among other objections, the assets included may not be in the same
location as the foreign affiliate, and assets financed by borrowed or equity
capital provided by others than the parent are excluded. For further
discussion of various indicators of the extent of direct investment abroad,
seeKravisand Lipsey (1988).—3—
affiliates. They are from the mandatory reports of parents and affiliates in
the 1982 benchmark survey of U.S. direct investment abroad (U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1985) This source includes the activity variables for parents as
well as affiliates, and a wide variety of other balance sheet, income state-
ment, and operating variables. Variables from this source used here in
addition to the activity variables include parents' and affiliates' exports,
parents' imports from their affiliates, and the number of employees and their
compensation for both parents and affiliates. It was possible to analyze the
data for individual firms (parents and affiliates) despite government pro-
hibitions against disclosure of individual reports through an arrangement in
which we specified regressions to be run or special tables to be prepared
which were then executed by the Department of Commerce.4
The industrial classification used in the report on the benchmark survey
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 1985) includes over 20 service (non—commodity
producing) industries. The main categories into which they fall are wholesale
trade; finance, insurance and real estate; and "services." "Services" in-
cludes "business services" such as advertising, and other services such as
hotels and health services. Here we use the term "nonbusiness services" to
cover the industries classified by Commerce under its "service" rubric but not
as "business services;" hotels and health services are examples. We also
include transportation and retail trade in the nonbusiness service category.
A criterion of confining the regressions to industries with at least 15
parents restricted the number of "basic" service industries (i.e., not further
subdivided in the Commerce classification) to four —finance(excluding bank-
ing), advertising, computer services, and engineering. In the tables which
We are grateful to Mr. Arnold Gilbert of the Bureau of Economic Analysis of
the U.S. Department of Commerce who played the key role in this arrangement
and whose extensive knowledge of the data was invaluable.—4—
follow, regressions are reported for these four industries, and for certain
-aggregationsof basic industries, such as business service industries. There
is also a set of regressions for all service industries which includes all the
industries already mentioned plus petroleum trade and oil field services.
It is widely recognized that the service industries are a heterogeneous
set of activities with wide variations in key industrial characteristics, such
as capital labor/ratios, wage levels and use of human capital, and technolog-
ical sophistication. The heterogeneity of the service sector, as compared
with the goods sector, and especially with manufacturing, is illustrated by
the following comparisons for two important industry characteristics (capital
per employee and compensation per employee):
Plant, Property, & Equipment
per Employee Services Goods Manufacturing
Standard deviation 141.9 83.1 21.3
Standard deviation/mean 1.70 1.57 .63
Compensation per Employee
Standard deviation 9.70 5.93 5.97
Standard deviation/mean .363 .205 .211
The Commerce classification contains a larger number of detailed
("basic") industries in the goods sectors —morethan 30 in manufacturing
alone —butsince our main interest here is a comparison with the service
industries, we confine our presentation of regressions to the total for all
manufacturing and to each of the six major manufacturing sub—industries (food,
chemicals, metals, nonelectrical machinery, electrical machinery, and trans-
port equipment). Although manufacturing is included for comparative purposes,
there is, of course, an inherent interest in the results for this sector which—5—
is often regarded as the archetypal industry for foreign investment. Actu-
ally, manufacturing affiliates accounted for 38% of all affiliate sales; pet-
roleum, including petroleum services such as oil field services and petroleum
wholesale trade, 35%; and most of the rest are sales of service industries.
[11E1715 A distinction has to be made between majority—owned affiliates
(MAJs) and those in which parents owned a 50 percent or minority interest
(MINe). For all industries, MAJs accounted for 78% of affiliate sales (11E17,
111E17) and the MAJs share was the sa in all services (special tabulation).
Effect of foreign affiliate activity on U.S. employment
We turn our attention first to the reallocation hypothesis, examining the
relationships of U.S. employment by parent firms in each industry to the three
indicators of its foreign affiliate activity (total assets; property, plant,
and equipment (PPE); and net sales6). We include parent sales as an indepen-
dent variable in all the regressions as a proxy for parent production to hold
constant the influence of the size of the parent firm.
There is a striking difference between service industries and manufac-
turing in the degree to which parent employment is related to the three
independent variables describing affiliate activity. In manufacturing, there
is only a small difference among the variables; they all, in combination with
parent sales, explain parent employment well, although affiliate netsales has
a slight edge. In services, however, outside of wholesale trade and finance,
where PPE explains employment best, the net sales variable explains parent
employment better than either of the other two variables. We therefore
References such as these are to tables in the benchmark survey (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1985).
6 Sales less imports from parents.-6-
concentrateon the net sales equations in the text, although all, three sets
are shown in the appendixes. (See Appendix Table 1.)
The relationship of parent employment to affiliate net sales in all
service industries combined (589 parents) is as follows:
(1) PEM ——1.491+.oiiPs —.0096MAJS+.020MINS —86
(2.0) (55.9) (10.9) (6.5)
where PEM is parent employment; PS, parent sales, and KAJS and MINS are the
net sales (sales minus imports from the U.S.) of majority—owned and minority—
owned affiliates, respectively. (*Significant at the 1% level.)
Given the level of parent sales, including exports, a million dollar
increase in MAJ sales, reduces thenumberof parent jobs by 10. Iligher KIN
sales add to parent employment —about20 jobs per million dollars of sales.
When results for individual service industries are examined (Table 1,
columns 2—5), the direction of the relationship between parent employment and
sales of majority—owned affiliates is negative somewhat more often than not,
although the relationship 1. significant in only half of the cases. Of those
coefficients that are significant at the 5Z level, four are negative and two
are positive. For sales by minority—owned affiliates, there is no predom-
inance of plus or minus signs, and the one significant coefficient was nega-
tive. (See Table 1 and Appendix Table 2.) The positive relation of parent
employment to minority—owned affiliate sales found in the equation for all
service industries does not appear in any of the groups or individual service
industries we could examine separately. Thus, that positive association is
apparently an industry phenomenon and the causation may well run in the
opposite direction; industries with high employment/sales ratios at home were






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































For manufacturing firms, the regression based on all 1214 parents is as
follows:
(2) PEM =1.219+.010PS —.0028KAJS
—.0037MINS —.918*
(6.3) (73.8) (10.5) (10.3)
(*Significant at the 1% level.)
As in the service industries, employment of parents in manufacturing indus-
tries, given their level of production, is negatively related to sales of
their majority owned affiliates, but the impact is smaller than in services.
A more substantial difference is that employment of manufacturing parents is
negatively correlated with sales of minority owned affiliates. While we
interpret the causation as running from the level of foreign production to
labor intensity in the U.S., the alternative interpretation is that, in
manufacturing, the less labor—intensive firma produce more abroad.
The significant MAJScoefficientsare negative in 3 individual manufac-
turing industries and positive in only 1 (electrical machinery). (See Table 1
and Appendix Table 2.) The coefficients for MINS are also predominantly
negative but the only 2 significant coefficients are split. Nonelectrical
machinery is the industry with a positive (and significant) coefficient.
The generally negative associations between affiliate sales and parent
employment fit with a finding in earlier work (Kravis and Lipsey, 1982) that
manufacturing firms produce in a more labor—intensive manner abroad than in
the U.S. and in a more labor—intensive manner the lower the cost of labor in a
country. As was pointed out in that paper, this response to differences in
the price of labor could occur in at least two ways. The multinational firm
could produce the same goods in low—wage countries as in high—wage countries,
but in a more labor—intensive manner. For example, Chevrolets produced in—8—
Africa might be polished and finished in a mach more labor—intensive way than
those assembled in the U.S. That is the standard case of locating production
at different points along a single isoquant in response to different prices of
labor (Figure 1.) The other way the multinational first might respond would
be to allocate its production of capital—intensive goods for the world market
to its high wage locations and its production of labor—intensive goods to its
low—wage locations. For example, the semiconductor industry could locate its
capital—intensive or technology—intensive wafer production to the U.S. and its
labor—intensive assembly operations to Malaysia (Figure 2.)
In the former case, assuming that cars sold in Africa had to be assembled
in Africa, the existence of the African assembly operation or its size should
have no effect on the input of labor per unit of U.S. production. In the
second case, however, a firm with extensive assembly operations overseas would
be substituting labor—intensive production in Malaysia for labor—intensive
production in the U.S. The finding here that larger foreign operations are
associated with lower parent employment suggests the latter explanation.
Another possibility is that the less labor—intensive firms in an indus-
try, or perhaps the firms that are more efficient overall, tend to invest more
heavily in foreign production because they have the firm—specific assets that
encourage direct investment.
The inclusion of the parent sales variable in these regressions is in
tended as a way of holding constant, or removing the influence on parent
employment of, the size of the parent company's output. The assumption
involved is that sales are roughly proportional to output, particularly within
industries. Presumably, sales that do not come from the parents' output, such


















A closer approximation to parent output1 particularly for industries such
as motor vehicles in which imports from affiliates are important, would be
parent sales net of imports from affiliates. We can testfor the significance
of such an adjustment by adding a variable for imports from affiliates to
equations I and 2, with the results as given in equations 3 and 4.
All services:
(3) PEM a—•575+OI1PS—.OIOMAJS+.OI8MINS—.026M —.893*
(.7) (56.5) (11.1) (6.0) (2.0)
Manufacturing:
(4) PEM —.939+.OIIPS—.OOZ5MAJS—.OO22MINS—.012M 12 —.923*
(4.4) (68.6)(8.9) (5.2) (7.5)
where Mparent imports from all affiliates and the other terms are as previ-
ously defined. (*Significant at the 1Z level.)
The coefficients of PS, KAJS, and MINS do not change very much when H is
added (compare equations 3 and 4 with I and 2), but thei2 increase slightly.
In manufacturing as a whole, the coefficient for imports is of about the
same size as that for parent sales. That suggests that the importvariable
acts as a correction to parent sales, and that it would, therefore, be approp-
riate to use a single variable for parent sales net of imports from affili
ates. In services, however, where imports are ich less important than in
manufacturing, the import coefficient is much larger than that for parent
sales, an indication that the import variable represents some other phenomenon.
Equations for individual manufacturing industries (Appendix Table 3) show
only three significant coefficients for imports, all negative. The import
coefficient for the metals industry is similar to the parent sales coefficient
but those for chemicals and transport equipment are a.ch larger. A possible—10—
interpretation is thatparents in the metals industry are importing from the
affiliatesgoods of capital intensity similar to their home production while
those in chemicals and transport equipment are importing goods of lower cap-
ital intensity than their home production. If that were the case, it would be
in accord with the idea that firms tend to assign the least capital—intensive
production to their affiliates. It is puzzling, however, that in the electri-
cal machinery and equipment industry, where this pattern has been documented,
we find no significant import coefficient.
The equations for individual service industries show no significant
coefficients for imports. That may be because imports are very small and
because the location of production and the meaning of exports and imports are
not easy to define in service industries. The fact that the import coeffi-
cient was negative and significant in the overall service equation, but not in
individual industry equations suggests that there may be some tendency for
imports to come from the more labor—intensive industries, even ifnot from
labor—intensivesegments within individual service industries.
In general, the sales variables explain a large part of the variation in
employment among firms, but the formulation is a very simple one and a ques-
tion may be raised about the robustness of the results were other explanatory
variables such as factor intensities and relative wages added.
We did not explore these poesibilities very extensively, but we did try
adding to the independent variables the ratio of affiliate to parent compen-
sation per employee. The theory behind this variable is that a low ratio of
affiliate to parent wage represents an ability to locate affiliate production
in low wage countries. A high ratio represents an inability to cake advantage
of low—wage locations. A high ratio should, therefore, be associated with low
ratios of parent imports to parent sales and therefore with high parent employment—ii—.
for any level of parent sales. The equations for all services and inanufactur—
ing are as follows:
ParentMM WIN Affiliate/Parent —2
Intercept Sales Sales Sales Wage _____
(5)All Services —.959 +.011—.010+.019 + .354 .89*
(.6) (56.3) (11.6) (6.0) (.2)
(6) Manufactures.710 ÷ .010 —.0028—.0037+ .915 .92*
(1.5) (70.8) (10.2) (9.9) (1.5)
(*Significant at the 1% level)
In the corresponding equations for basic industries (see AppendixTable 4) the
coefficient of the new variable was positive whenever the t—ratio exceeded
1
(5 service and 2 manufacturing industries). However, both in theoverall
equations and in the equations for the basic industries, thecoefficients of
affiliate sales remained almost the same. In the overall equations:
Coefficient of
MAJS MINS
Without With wage Without With wage
wage variable variable variable variable
All services —.0096 —.010 .020 .019
Manufacturing —.0028 —.0028 .0037 —.0037
Thus the contribution of the relative wage variable is limited to thehint
given (by its tendency toward positive coefficients)that a greater ability
of a firm or industry to shift production to low—wage countries, reduces
parent employment per unit of output, or, in other words, thelabor intensity
of parent output.—12—
Compensation Per Employee
Foreign activity of U.S. affiliates may affect U.S. labor not only
through direct impacts on the number of jobs but also by affecting the demands
for various types of labor. Given the lower wages for unskilled labor outside
the United States, it might be expected that firms that can allocate different
parts of their production to different host countries would placetheir most
skill—intensive production in the U.S. and their unskilled—labor intensive
production in their overseas affiliates. The effect of such an allocation of
production would presumably be to raise the demand for skilled labor and
reduce the demand for unskilled labor in the U.S. Even if no such skill—based
allocation of production were feasible, a growth of foreign activity might
tend to require increased supervisory input at home and therefore a shift in
demand toward high—paid personnel.
We test for the effect of foreign activity in two ways. One is to relate
the average compensation level of parents, which we take as representing the
average skill level, to measures of parent size and affiliate size,distin-
guishing between majority—owned and minority—owned affiliates on the theory
that they may represent different strategies in the allocation of production
or perform different roles for the parents. The other is to relate average
parent compensation to the relative size of affiliate operations.
When parent compensation per employee is related to the sales of parents
and affiliates few statistically significant equations are obtained (See Table
1, columns 6—9). In the equations for all services none of the independent
variables has a significant coefficient. In the basic industries, even a
liberal definition (10 per cent) of significance for the equation as a whole
puts within the pale only wholesale trade in durables, "services" as a group,
nonbusiness services as a group, and transportation. In all of these cases,—13--
all,the affiliate coefficients with a t"statistic above one are positive,
suggesting a faintly perceptible positive relation of affiliate production to
parent average skill levels. Things look a little betterinmanufacturing;
for all manufacturing theequationis:
(7)PC —25.95+.0005PS+.0002MAJS+.OO1QMINS. 12—.05*
(112.3) (3.1) (.6) (2.4)
where PCparent compensation per employee and the other variables have the
same definitions as in the previous equations. (*Significant at the IZlevel.)
In the manufacturing subindustries the equations meet the 10 percent
level of significance in 4 out of the 6 cases and here, too, all. the affiliate
coefficients with a t—statistic above 1 are positive.
Similar results were obtained from equations in which compensation per
employee was related to the ratio of affiliate to parent sales. (See Appendix
Table 5, column 4.) There were few significant coefficients for the inde-
pendent variable (3 out of 11 in services, and 1 out of 6 in manufacturing),
but the signs were predominately positive (10 out of 11 and 5 out of 6).
While these results are weak, they do serve to confirm the earlier con-
clusion that manufacturing firms are more able to shift activities to loca-
tions with low—cost factors of production than are service firms.Inthis
case, it is cheap unskilled labor that attracts U.S. firms and causesthem to
shift the operations intensive in low—skilled labor.
The effects of foreign operations on exports
We have,upto this point, examined the effects of foreign production on
U.S. parent employment holding constant the level of parent sales. If foreign
production substituted for domestic production, it would affect the level of—14—
domestic employment, butthatimpact would be obscured by the use of total
parent sales as an independent variable. We ignored this problem on the
ground that previous work8 has failed to uncover any substitution of foreign
production for exports but that work has been confined to manufacturing and it
is advisable to test those results and extend them to services.
Although exports are small relative to total sales in most industries (in
1982, 11% of sales of manufacturing parents and 6 percent for service industry
parents9) we would like to know whether foreign affiliate activity (net sales)
on balance is supportive of U.S. exports or substitutes for them.
The earlier results for manufacturing are confirmed and extended to
service industries by regressions using the benchmark Ff1 survey data to link
exports to foreign affiliate net sales:
All services:
(8) Par X •—16.70 —.003 PSU + .4033 MAJS —.1649MINS —.620*
(1.1) (.9) (26.9) (3.1)
Manufacturing:
(9) Par X ——12.11+ .129 PSU + .0007 MAJS + .050 MINS .721*
(2.0) (27.5) (.1) (4.7)
where Par X —parentexports, PSUparent sales in the U.S. (i.e., excluding
exports), and the other terms are as defined In previous equations. (Significant
at the IZ level.)
The coefficient of MINS in the service Industry equation is negative but
It Is more than offset by the larger positive coefficient for MAJS. Even if
the IIINS coefficient were equal though opposite in sign from the MAJScoef-
ficients, the overall effect of foreign affiliate net sales on parent exports
8 For theU.S., see Bergsten, Horat, and Moran (1978), Lipsey and Weiss (1981)
and (1984), and Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Kuichycky (1988). For the UK, see
Reddaway (1967) and (1968), and for Sweden see Swedenborg (1979) and (1982),
and Bloastrom, Lipsey, and Kulchycky (1988).
Kravis and Lipsey, 1988, Table 2.—15—
would be positive, since sales of majority owned affiliates are 3 to 4 times
as great as sales of minority owned affiliates.
In the basic service industries the MAJS coefficient is usually positive
and significant at the 5% level, while the MINS coefficient is significant
only in one industry —wholesalenondurables. (See Table 2.) It may be sur-
mised that these affiliates are marketing U.S. goods while this is not somuch
the case for affiliates of parents in other industries. With the exceptionof
advertising, for which affiliate sales are strongly negativelycorrelated with
parent exports, the combined effect of salesof majorityowned and minority
owned affiliates is positive in the individual industries. t4uch the same
story emerges when factor intensities (parent wage as askill proxy and
PPE/employment as a capital/labor ratio) are added to the salesvariables as
independent variables. (See Appendix Table 6.) The MAJS coefficientis
positive and significant in 10 out of 12 cases and dominates the negativeMINS
coefficient which appears in 5 cases (though only I is significant). Adver-
tising again is the exception, having negative coefficients for bothMAJS and
MINS.
tn the manufacturing equation, the coefficients of MAJS and MINS are both
positive, although only the latter is significant. In 4 of the 6 subindus
tries at least one of these coefficients is positive and significant and the
combined effect is positive (Table 2). The combined effect in one of the
other two, transportation equipment, is negative, but the negative MAJS coef-
ficient is only a little greater than its standard error and the positive MINS
coefficient a little less than its standard error. This summary applies also
to the equations in which factor intensities are added (Appendix Table 6).
The upshot of this exploration of the relationship of affiliate produc-
tion to parent exports is that in service industries, as in manufacturing,
affiliate production increases exports where it has any effect at all.— 15a
Table 2
Relationship Between Parent Exports and Parent and Affiliate Sales
Parent Sales MA.J PUN
Industry in U.S. Sales Sales _______
AllManufacturing .129 1.20E4 .050 .721*
(1105) (27.5) (.09) (4.7) (0.0)
Service—Related —2.995 .4033 —.1649 .620*
(456) (.87) (26.9) (3.1) (0.0)
Wholesale—Durable .023 .041 .143 •434*
(82) ( 3.5) (3.2) (.6) (0.0)
Wholesale—Nondurable 1.22E—3 .316 8.87 .908*
(48) (.03) (6.7) (6.2) (0.0)
Finance 7.97E3 .115 —3.50E3 .836*
(19) ( 5.0) ( 9.7) ( .7) (0.0)
Insurance -3.85E—4 .073 5.73E—3 •935*
(51) (.4) (18.1) ( .3) (0.0)
Services —1.55E3 .092 —.023 .508*
(133) (.8) (11.3) ( .4) (0.0)
Business Services 4.74E3 .037 .054 .072**
(75) ( 1.0) ( 2.1) ( .7) ( .04)
Advertising 1.84E3 —9.52E—4 —3.33E—3 •945*
(19) (17.4) ( 2.5) ( .5) (0.0)
Computer Services —.018 .450 .178 •755*
(15) ( 1.5) ( 6.8) (1.9) ( .0003)
Nonbusiness Services —3.12E3 .107 —.052 .736*
(58) (1.5) (12.5) ( .5) (0.0)
Engineering —.029 .139 —.167 .856*
(18) (1.2) ( 5.3) ( .8) (0.0)
Transportation 2.05E3 9.54E—3 4.39E3 .009
(36) (1.3) (.9) ( .04) ( .36)
Retail Trade 3.14E3 5.40E—3 —.014 .079
(39). (1.9) (.6) (1.5) ( .12)
Food 6.39E—3 6.67E3 .053 .004
(64) (.7) (.3) ( .7) ( .37)
Chemicals .074 —.016 .415 .894*
(153) (10.7) ( 1.2) (9.2) (0.0)
Metals .027 .088 .096 •433*
(146) (3.3) ( 3.1) (2.4) (0.0)
Nonelectric Machinery .061 .054 .541 .596*
(199) (1.7) ( 1.6) (5.9) (0.0)
Electrical Machinery .106 .300 —.285 .889*
(142) (8.4) ( 6.5) (2.2) (0.0)
Transportation Equipment .166 —.041 .028 .822*
(53) (8.4) ( 1.1) ( .8) (0.0)
Other Manufacturing .060 .080 .062
(348) (7.0) ( 4.4) (3.1) (0.0)
NB: Number of firmsandT ratios in parentheses. All values in .iillions of dollars.
Dependent variable: Parent exports.
*Significantat the 1% level.
**Signif Leant at the 5% level.—1 6--
Conclusion
We find that, given the size of parent operations at home, a firm that
produces more abroad more often than not has fewer employees in the U.S. and
pays slightly higher average wages and salaries. Both of these relationships
are stronger among manufacturing firms than among service industry firms. We
think the most plausible explanation is that factor proportions in the parent
firm change as affiliate activity increases: the ratio of labor to capital
declines and the skilled or professional labor content of production rises.
This would be the case if multinational firms tended to place their more labor
intensive operations abroad, leaving the more capital intensive and skill
intensive ones for home production.
An alternative explanation might be that affiliate sales abroad displace
U.S. exports. However, as in earlier studies for manufacturing, we found that
net sales or production by foreign affiliates tends, if anything, to increase
parent exports, and that this is the case in both manufacturing and services.
An exception to the apparent negative effect of affiliate production on
parent employment is the fact that production by minority—owned manufacturing
affiliates seems to increase parent employment. We attribute this effect to
the strong positive effect of production by these affiliates on parent ex-
ports. That relation is also noted in Blonstroin, Lipsey, and Kulchycky
(1988), where it is described as suggesting that minority—owned affiliate
production is even more of a method of buying market share for the parent than
is majority—owned affiliate production.
Another possible explanation of the negative relationship between parent
employment and affiliate sales might be that the parents' capital/labor ratios
are not altered by affiliate activity but that inputs of both capital and
labor decline as foreign activity increases. This could happen only if larger-17—
foreign operations madegreatereconomies of scale available for the parent
firm's operations. A possible example would be the spreading of the output of
R&D or some types of central management input over a larger volume of pro-
duction.
The conclusions that the production of U.S. parents is less labor inten-
sive than it would be if there were less affiliate production, and that the
quality of the labor the parents employ is higher, do not apply to differences
among firms in all service or all manufacturing industries.There is a great
deal of variation among the industries, and in many cases there is no visible
effect within detailed industries. We conclude that, especially in service
industries, the impact of foreign operations on domestic employment and skill
levels should not be a major consideration in assessing the desirability of
encouraging overseas production by U.S. firms.— 18—
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Relationship of Parent Eaploysenc to Sales and Parent Laports
Industry Parei t4AJ KIN Par. Isports
(No. of fi) ________ Sales Net Sales Net Sales from AllAff.
AllManufacturing .923* .011 —.0025 —.0022 —.012
(1105) (0.0) (68.6) (8.9) (5.2) (7.5)
AllServices .893* .011 —.010 .018 —.026
(454) (0.0) (56.5) (11.1) (6.0) (2.0)
Wholesale—Durable •519' .0037 .0011 —.031 .077
(82) (0.0) (5.2) (.8) (1.3) (3.4)
Wholesale—Nondurable .561* .0034 —.0018 .0017 —.107
(48) (0.0) (5.8) (.9) (.08) (.5)
Finance —
Insurance — — — — —
Services .718* .026 —.024 .059 -.090
(132) (0.0) (17.8) (3.5) (1.3) (.1)
BusinessServices •353* .017 —.0080 —.0029 1.860
(74) (0.0) (6.5) (.8) (.06) (.5)
Advertising .849* .014 .0015 2.75 E—4 —54.74
(19) (0.0) (3.4) (.4) (.01) (1.4)
Computer Service. .805* .027 —.027 —.042 —1.16
(15) (.0003) (7.2) (1.3) (1.4) (.1)
Nonbusiness Services .781* .028 —.032 .151 .148
(58) (0.0) (13.8) (3.2) (1.7) (.2)
Engineering .392** .029 —.038 —.0087 .134
(18) (.03) (3.0) (2.1) (.1) (.9)
Transportation .834* .015 .0065 —.117 .479
(36) (0.0) (13.1) (.9) (1.5) (.3)
Retail .888* .011 —.0037 .016 —.012
(39) (0.0) (10.0) (.6) (2.4) (.2)
Food .663' .011 —.0021 —.019 —.057
(64) (0.0) (9.4) (.8) (1.9) (1.0)
Ch..icals .899* .0082 —.0014 .0011 —.083
(153) (0.0) (16.6) (1.8) (.4) (3.4)
Metals .922' 10 .0022 2.11 E4 —.012
(146) (0.0) (30.4) (1.8) (.1) (2.2)
Macelectric Macbinary .963* .014 —.0040 .010 .013
(199) (0.0) (20.0) (5.1) (4.7) (1.0)
Electric Machin.ry .915* .011 .0035 —.0067 —.0027
(142) (0.0) (28.9) (2.0) (1.4) (.5)
Transportation .993' .012 —.0030 4.41 E4 —.023
Equipment (0.0) (35.1) (6.8) (.7) (5.9)
(53)
Other Manufacturing .905' .0099 .0022 —.0070 —.0085
(348) (0.0) (33.3) (2.8) (9.3) (.8)
NI: Number offirmsand T ratiosin parentheses. Allvalues inmillions of dollars.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Appendix Table 5
RelationshipBetwen ParentCompensation perEmployee
and Indicators ofRelativeI0FA Activity
No. of
—2 MAJ/Parent MAJ/Parent HAJ/Parent
Firms R Assets Sales PPE
Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)






.0003 —.126 6.08 E—3
(.9) (1.5)

































No. of —2 MAJ/Parent NAJ/Parent MAJ/Parent
Firms Assets Sales PPE
Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)























( .7) ( .3)















(1.9) (2.0)— 3c —
AppendixTable 5 (continued)
No. of MAJ/Parent MAJ/Parent MAJ/Parent
Firms i2 Assets Sales PFE
Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)









































No. of —2 MA.J/Parent MAJ/Parent MAJ/Parent
Fires R Assets Sales PPE
Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)







( .9) ( .2)







( .6) ( .08)
















NB: Dependent variable: parent coepeneation per eeployee.
*Significantat the 12 level.
**Significant at the 52 level.A
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